



FINANCIAL REPORTING INCENTIVES:  
TAXATION AND EXTERNAL FINANCING NEED
ABSTRACT
Earnings management literature extensively explores tax regime and debt contra-
cting as possible incentives in financial reporting. Firms engage with aggressive 
financial reporting to bias earnings in periods when the need for external financing 
increases. Contrary to this, the tax burden represents incentive for more conserva-
tive reporting.
We argue that the level of firm’s financial reporting aggressiveness is not constant 
but rather floating from period to period, directly affecting the quality of financial 
reports. We assume that firm’s management on its own discretion determines the 
level of conservatism, balancing between these two incentives. The prevailing of two 
incentives, the need for external financing and the tax burden, determines the level 
of conservatism in particular reporting period.
We hypothesised that the reduction in tax burden incentive overcomes the debt con-
tracting incentive in the years of decreasing external financing need, implying more 
conservative accounting to balance between economic and taxable income. The total 
accruals are used as a measure of earnings management reflected to working capital 
accruals.
The data analysis conducted on financial reports of 297 firms in the time-series of 
five years shows a significant correlation between total accruals, external financing 
needs and  difference between economic and taxable income. 
Key words: Accounting conservatism, Discretionary accruals, Earnings manage-
ment, External financing need, Tax burden
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1. INTRODUCTION
The accounting-based performance measurement represents one way of mitigating 
agency problems in debt contracting. Firms’ have incentive to bias earnings, disc-
losed in the financial reports, and shift the risk of potential losses to borrowers. The 
incentive to engage with aggressive financial reporting may be especially pronoun-
ced in case the debt contract grounds on accounting-based covenants. Accounting 
conservatism is believed to improve contract efficiency by lowering informational 
asymmetry between the firm and the borrower. Vice versa, aggressive financial re-
porting is believed to be less informative as it does not anticipate systemic risks.
Another influence on financial reporting relate to the tax regime, bearing in mind 
that the taxation reduces resources available to the firm. The level of taxation bur-
den is expected to correlate to the conservatism. Dai et al. (2008) predict that in the 
presence of capital gains taxes, the net effect on asset prices is ambiguous, while the 
relative strength of the capitalization effect and the lock-in effect depends on the time 
period surrounding a tax rate change and firm characteristics such as dividend policy, 
growth potential, and the percentage of tax-sensitive individual ownership.
Firms may decide not to evaluate accounts receivable, in case that tax reporting 
requires correction for obscure expenditure. Instead, assets are valued based on tax 
rules, not on economic values, so financial reporting is aggressive. We then assume 
that firms tend to be aggressive for both financial reporting and tax reporting purpo-
ses, but prior research argue that the firms disclosing particular differences between 
tax and book values of income and assets are subject to greater scrutiny from regu-
lators (Badertscher et al., 2009).
In the countries where financial reporting and tax reporting differ it is expected that 
the taxes may represent the incentive for firms’ financial reporting. This difference 
is expected to be visible in the difference between book and tax income. Since the 
tax is reducing resources available to the firm, the financial reporting tends to be less 
aggressive and conditional conservatism is more pronounced. Bushman and Piotro-
ski (2006) argue that the country’s conditional conservatism level is directly affected 
by the tax regime, as well as institutional structures and political economy. 
This study provides an evidence on the association between conditional conser-
vatism and external financing needs against anticipated tax sheltering activities in 
the economy with rather weak legal enforcement and widely spread use of accoun-
ting-based covenants in debt contracting, proposing that the conditional conservati-




Devine (1963) defines accounting conservatism as a wisdom of anticipating no pro-
fits and provision for all possible losses and a conservative behaviour as arousing 
lower average expectations of goals fulfilment than alternative measuring and repor-
ting actions.
Conservatism is sometimes connected to prudence as accounting principle with Ger-
man origin (Ball & Shivakumar, 2005).  Maltby (2000) argues that the term prudence 
preserved meaning as moral behaviour or virtue of accountants, in contrast to the 
term conservatism that started to gain meaning as a part of creative accounting at 
the end of the nineteenth century. He points out that the special characteristic of 
conservatism, which distinguished it from the earlier understanding of accounting 
prudence, was to deliberate understatement of profit and assets.
Prior literature extends the view arguing that the book value of earnings reflects out-
dated information. Inspired by efficient market hypothesis authors accepted opinion 
that all proxies based on this accounting information can be enhanced with inclusion 
of market data as returns. (Ahmed, 1994). The difference between book and mar-
ket value of equity consequently is represented in the valuations of firm’s earnings. 
Following this rationale, Basu (1997) introduces new proxy, asymmetric timeliness 
of earnings. Conservatism then represents the degree of current economic gains or 
losses within current accounting income. 
Watts (2003) defines conservatism as a characteristic of an accrual accounting system 
that captures the notion that the system requires stronger verification to recognize 
gains than losses resulting in the understatement of net assets and accumulated ear-
nings. He argues that the existence and persistence of conservatism in accounting is 
generated by asymmetric loss functions associated with the economic determinants 
of conservatism, namely contracting, litigation, regulation and taxation. This is well 
explored in prior literature and pinned under the term conditional conservatism. 
The literature suggests that conditional conservatism increases the efficiency of debt 
contracting by accelerating the violation of accounting-based covenants and tran-
sferring control rights from shareholders to creditors. (Zhang 2008)
The level of accounting conservatism may be considered from two perspectives on 
the accounting information function, valuation perspective where the accounting in-
formation is primarily used by decision-makers to determine the market value of 
equity and contracting perspective where information is used for contracting purpo-
ses (Ruch, 2015). 
According to some authors, conservatism is considered as one of desirable earnings 
attribute, together with accrual quality, persistence, predictability, smoothness, value 
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relevance, timeliness, by one-part research stream (Francis et al., 2004; Ball et al., 
2000; Ball & Shivakumar, 2006). Qiang (2007) argues that the conditional conserva-
tism improves contracting efficiency where the firm litigation induces both conditio-
nal and unconditional conservatism, suggesting that both forms help avoid investor 
litigation against firms. He also believes that the regulation induces unconditional 
conservatism, indicating that this form helps prevent regulatory intervention. 
Recent studies note that some proposed explanations do not apply to both forms. 
Basu (2005) suggests that taxation is likely to generate unconditional conservatism. 
Ball and Shivakumar (2005) argue that contracting generates conditional conserva-
tism, which is partially supported by Ball et al.’s (2005) finding on debt contracting.
Ball and Shivakumar (2005) argue that conditional conservatism improves contra-
cting efficiency by disclosing net present value projects that may trigger debt cove-
nant violations. Guay and Verrecchia (2006) believe that conservatism also forgoes 
positive net present value projects and retains unnecessary capital within a firm, 
thereby reducing contracting efficiency. 
The role of regulatory frameworks are also believed to play role in usefulness of 
conservatism. Li (2015) proposes that the conditional conservatism may increase the 
efficiency of debt contracting by accelerating the violation of accounting-based co-
venants and transferring control rights from shareholders to creditors, having effect 
on the cost of debt in countries where accounting-based covenants are more widely 
spread. In its cross-country study, he argues that a higher level of a country’s conser-
vative reporting system leads to lower cost of equity and debt capital. He interprets 
the conclusion that the observed conditional conservatism level in a country is an 
equilibrium outcome balancing various institutional forces and deviating from such 
level may be costly and difficult in the short run.
Many authors argue that the tax sheltering represents an incentive for accounting 
conservatism.  Qiang (2007) argues that the taxation induces unconditional conser-
vatism, indicating that this form is preferable in deferring taxes. Shackelford and 
Shevlin (2001) find that firms exhibit two behaviours. First, tax minimizing strate-
gies often result in lower book income due to book-tax conformity. Second, large 
book-tax differences incentivise firms to be less conservative in financial reporting 
when reducing taxable income.
The corporate tax avoidance is well explored in previous studies (Slemrod, 2004; 
Chen and Chu, 2005; Crocker and Semrod, 2005; and Desai et al., 2007). Frank et al. 
(2009) find that tax aggressiveness is positively associated with aggressive financial 
reporting, reflecting earning management practices.
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Balancing between two incentives, contracting purposes and tax reporting, may re-
present managerial incentive for balancing the level of financial reporting aggres-
siveness and disclosed earnings in particular period or across more periods. Jones 
(1991) elaborated how managers face conflicting financial reporting incentives and 
choose incentive in their best interest. Dechow and Skinner (2000) suggest further 
research on earnings management to focus on managerial incentives. Zhang (2004) 
proposes research in earnings behaviour pertaining to investment decisions. Also, 
financial reporting behaviour change is associated with the debt contracting appli-
cation motivation (Muratovic-Dedic and Serdarević, 2017). Hanlon and Heitzman 
(2010) believe that the tax related research in accounting may explore the theory of 
corporate tax avoidance, trade-offs and relations between financial reporting and tax 
reporting incentives. García Lara et al. (2005) point out that in European continental 
countries managers have prevailing incentives to decrease earnings in order to redu-
ce tax, dividends and others motivations.
3. Hypothesis Development 
The external financing need as a firm’s incentive to accounting conservatism is ob-
served through the contracting covenants grounding on accounting numbers. Ball et 
al. (2008) argue that the early recognition of losses can detect covenant violation in 
a timelier manner and lead to timely triggering of lenders’ contractual rights to veto 
major decisions by loss-making managers. This is believed to lead to the erosion of 
debt quality through risky new investments and acquisitions, borrowing, dividends 
and stock repurchases.
The external financing need is based on the model introduced by Demirguc-Kunt 
and Maksimovic (1998) and further explored in relation to accounting conservatism 
by Kang et al. (2015), where the estimation of the firm’s constrained growth rate is 
based on the percentage of revenue.
         (1)
Where 
EFN is the firm’s external financing need
gt is the firm’s growth (measured by sales growth), 
At is the firm’s total assets, 
Et is earnings after interest and taxes
bt is the proportion of earnings retained for reinvestment.
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Corporate tax burden is another segment of our analysis. We represent the tax burden 
in the current year as the ratio of taxable income and economic income. The taxable 
income is calculated based on the profit tax related obligation in the current year 
and the earnings before taxes disclosed in financial reports represent an economic 
income.
TAXit=TAXOt/(EBTt * 0,1)                                                                        (2)
Where
TAXo is the firm’s corporate tax obligation in current period,
EBTt represents earnings before taxes in current period.
We argue that the firm may act in more aggressive financial reporting in period of 
high or increasing external financing needs and apply more conservative accounting 
choices when the need is met and assume that the tax burden may represent preva-
iling incentive in periods of stagnating or decreasing need for external financing.
This argument is based on the assumption (Li 2015) that creditors protect themselves 
through binding contracts based on a series of performance measures in periodic 
financial reports, bearing the downside risks and facing limited upside potentials and 
thereby favor a conservative financial reporting system to minimize the default risk 
(Zhang 2008). Li (2015) argues that the limited upside potential of debt claims, in-
fluences creditors to have less incentive to require managers to recognize good news 
timely, especially when the firm value is far above the face value of the debt. The 
supportive evidence is given by Guay and Verrecchia (2007) who argue that conditi-
onal conservatism may also reduce the cost of capital by reducing the discount rate 
that market applies to firm value in the presence of uncertainty.
Givoly and Hayn (2000) used sign and magnitude of accruals as indication of con-
servatism degree. Further, Dechow et al. (2012) pointed out conservatism relation to 
earnings management and presented comparison for widely used earnings manage-
ment models based on discretionary accruals. The authors argue that there is reversal 
of earnings management reflected to working capital accruals and that represents 
rather novel approach. We use this model of employed non cash working capital 
accruals as a measure of accruals where: 
TACCit = (ΔCAit – ΔCit -  ΔCLit + ΔSTDit - Depit)/At-1              (3)
Where: 
CA represents current assets, 
C represents cash, 
CL represents current liabilities, 
STD represents debt included in current liabilities,
A represents total assets.
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Hypothesis: The level of applied accounting conservatism is strongly positively 
associated with the external finance need and economic earnings.
Reduction in tax burden incentive then overcomes the debt contracting incentive in 
the years of decreasing external financing need, implying more conservative accoun-
ting to balance between economic and taxable income; and vice versa.
We use the following regression model to estimate the impacts of tax burden and 
external financing need on conditional conservatism: 
                                                                                                                     (4)
In order to control obtained results we included control variable size in estimation. 
Following previous literature, firms’ size is represented as natural logarithm of firms’ 
assets.
                                                                                                                     (5)
Every firm is special and has different capacity and resources, so we em-
ployed fixed effects regression for previous estimations in order to capture 
intrafirm (within) variation over time.
4. Sample and Descriptive Statistics
The data is obtained from financial statements of firms established and operating in 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Total sample descriptive statistics and corre-
lations is provided in tables. Total sample included 1395 observations for 279 firms 
in the five-year time series. This data sample used in research is strongly balanced.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
A 1395 140 80.56873 1 279
IND 0
YEAR 1395 2012 1.414721 2010 2014
EFN 1373 5.70e+08 9.85e+09 -3.226062 2.37e+11
TAX 1395 -7.836968 1368.215 -21058 35578
TACC 1395 398.8535 20995.24 -405909 618327
To be included in the final sample, a firm must have financial statement data required 
for computing the research variables. So, the final sample included 1373 observati-
ons (financial statements).
UNIVERSITY OF ZENICA FACULTY OF ECONOMICS64
5. Empirical Results
The Pearson correlation matrix for variables employed within hypothesis testing 
subsection shows high correlation between total accruals and corporate tax burden 
(correlation coefficient is 0.62). In more concrete, there is a high correlation between 
discretionary accruals and the tax burden. The correlation between discretionary ac-
cruals and the external financing needs is somewhat lower (0.4427), similar as the 
correlation between external financing needs and the tax burden (0.3907).




TACC 0.4427 0.6224 1.0000
TACC 1395 398.8535
Since every firm is unique with different characteristics and unique financial capaci-
ty, we are interested in intrafirm (within) variation over time, fixed effects regression 
is employed. In this research we consider fixed effects regression as best way to 
avoid potential omitted variable bias. 
Table 3: Estimation of fixed-effect regression (obs=1373)
Fixed-effects (within) regression Number of obs          = 1373
Group variable: A Number of groups     = 277
R-sq:    within     = 0.4345 Obs per group: min   = 1
             between  = 0.4338                          avg   = 5.0
             overall    = 0.4344                         max   = 5
F(2,1094)                  = 420.28
corr (u_i, Xb)    = -0.0004 Prob > F                    = 0.0000
tacc Coef. Std. Err. t P>׀t׀ [99% Conf. Interval]
efn 5.07e-07 5.30e-08 9.58 0.000 3.71e-07 6.44e-07
tax 8.134217 .3789035 21.47 0.000 7.156521 9.111913
_cons 180.948 431.4292 0.42 0.675 -932.2821 1294.178
tacc 1395 398.8535 20995.24 -405909 618327
sigma_u 7.095.5925
sigma_e 15943.569
rho .16532028 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
F test all u_i=0: F(276, 1094)  =           0.99 Prob > F   =   0.5331
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Fixed effects estimation of equation (4) capture significant positive association of 
both independent variables with total accruals (Table 3.). Tax burden is positively 
associated with change in total accruals (8.134). So, stronger association is captured 
between tax burden and total accruals than external financing need and total accruals.
Table 4: Estimation of fixed-effect regression with control variable ln (TA)
Fixed-effects (within) regression Number of obs          = 1373
Group variable: A Number of groups     = 277
R-sq:    within     = 0.4358 Obs per group: min   = 1
             between  = 0.3803                           avg   = 5.0
             overall    = 0.4238                          max   = 5
F(2,1094)                   = 281.37
corr (u_i, Xb)    = -0.0513 Prob > F                     = 0.0000
tacc Coef. Std. Err. t P>׀t׀ [99% Conf. Interval]
efn 4.97e-07 5.33e-08 9.32 0.000 3.60e-07 6.35e-07
tax 8.199685 .3809618 21.52 0.000 7.216675 9.182694
lnTA -1756.11 1123.199 -1.56 0.118 -4654.341 1142.121
_cons 22068.3 14005.68 1.58 0.115 -14071.05 58207.64
sigma_u 7.469.6895
sigma_e 15933.053
rho .18018646 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
F test all u_i=0: F(276, 1093)  =           0.99 Prob > F   =   0.5446
As it can be seen in Table 4. with results of estimation with included control variable 
representing firm’s size, similar significant association are captured. So, these results 
confirm that reduction in tax burden overcomes debt contracting incentive.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The literature suggests that the aggressive financial reporting is especially prono-
unced in cases where debt contracts ground on accounting-based covenants where 
conditional conservatism positively affects the efficiency of debt contracting. Many 
authors also believe that the taxation burden correlates to the conservatism where tax 
aggressiveness positively associates with aggressive financial reporting. While Qia-
ng (2007) suggests that both conditional and unconditional conservatism help avoid 
investor litigation against firms, Ball and Shivakumar (2005) argue that conditional 
conservatism improves contracting efficiency by disclosing net present value proje-
cts that may trigger debt covenant violations and Ball and Shivakumar (2005) argue 
that contracting generates conditional conservatism.
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We examine managerial incentives to decrease earnings in order to reduce tax in per-
sistent corporate tax regulation, controlling against fluctuating year-to-year external 
finance need. We hypothesized that the reduction in tax burden incentive overco-
mes the debt contracting incentive in years of decreasing external financing need, 
implying more conservative accounting to balance between economic and taxable 
income. 
The analysis uses Dechow et al. (2012) discretionary accruals model of earnings ma-
nagement to capture managerial incentives. The external financing need is estimated 
using Kang et al. (2015) model that captures firm’s constrained growth rate based 
on the percentage of revenue. The corporate tax burden influence was measured as 
a difference between reported earnings and taxable earnings. Our findings are ro-
bust, showing that the accounting conservatism highly correlates to the corporate tax 
burden, while the correlation between discretionary accruals and external financing 
need is somewhat lower.
The analysis has shown strong positive association of both observed variables, tax 
burden and external finance need, with the total reported accruals, as a measure of 
accounting conservatism. 
Our findings show that firms exhibit earnings management practice to report higher 
earnings in periods of increasing need for external finance, aiming to improve the 
base for accounting-based covenants and to shift the risk to the borrower. However, 
the tax burden and anticipated outflow of resources embedded in the corporate tax, 
overcomes debt contracting as an incentive for more or less aggressive reporting.
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PODSTICAJI FINANSIJSKOG IZVJEŠTAVANJA: 
OPOREZIVANJE I POTREBA ZA  
EKSTERNIM FINANSIRANJEM
SAŽETAK
U literaturi upravljanja zaradama u značajnom obuhvatu je obrađivana tematika 
porezne regulative i ugovaranja kao mogućih poticaja u finansijskom izvještavanju. 
Pravna lica se opredjeljuju za agresivno izvještavanje kako bi iskazala visoke zarade 
u periodima povećanih potreba za eksternim finansiranjem. Nasuprot tome, porezno 
opterećenje predstavlja poticaj konzervativnijem izvještavanju.
Mi tvrdimo da razina agresivnosti u finansijskom izvještavanju pravnog lica nije 
konstantna, već da oscilira iz perioda u period, direktno utječući na kvalitet finansij-
skih izvještaja. Pri tome pretpostavljamo da menadžment firme na osnovu sopstvene 
diskrecije određuje razinu konzervatizma balansirajući između dva navedena poti-
caja. Slijedom toga, pretpostavljamo da trenutna prevaga jednog od dva poticaja, 
potreba za eksternim finansiranjem i porezno opterećenje, određuju razinu konzer-
vatizma u predmetnom izvještajnom periodu.
S tim u vezi, hipotetiziramo da smanjenje poticaja u vidu poreznog opterećenja pre-
vazilazi poticaj ugovaranja u godinama smanjenja potreba za eksternim finansira-
njem, što implicira konzervativnije računovodstvo koje se ogleda u uravnoteženju 
ekonomskih i oporezivih zarada. Ukupne akruale koristimo kao mjeru upravljanja 
zaradama, a koje se prevashodno ogleda u akrualima radnog kapitala.
Analiza podataka, provedena na finansijskim izvještajima 297 pravnih lica u vre-
menskoj seriji od pet godina, upućuje na značajnu korelaciju između ukupnih akru-
ala, potreba za eksternim finansiranjem i razlika između ekonomskih i oporezivih 
zarada.
Ključne riječi: Računovodstveni konzervativizam, diskrecijski obračun, upravljanje 
prihodima, potrebe za eksternim finansiranjem, poresko opterećenje
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